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GRAY v. NETHERLAND
116 S.Ct. 2074
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Coleman Gray was indicted for the capital murder of Richard
McClelland in the commission of robbery, 1 the robbery and abduction
of McClelland, the use of a firearm in the commission of each of those
felonies, and the arson of McClelland's car.2 The Commonwealth's
evidence tended to show that during the early morning hours of May 3,
1986, a car occupied by Gray and Melvin Tucker intercepted a vehicle
driven by McClelland. Gray forced McClelland into his car, and then
drove to McClelland's place of employment, a Murphy's Mart, and
forced him to open the store.
3
After stealing approximately $13,000 from the store, Gray drove to
an isolated road and parked his car. Ushering McClelland out of the car,
Gray forced him to lie face down on the ground. After answering
McClelland's pleas with assurances that he would not be harmed, Gray
rapidly fired six shots into the back of McClelland's head. Gray and
Tucker then returned to McClelland's car and, in an attempt to destroy
the evidence of the abduction, doused the inside with gasoline and set the
car on fire.
4
The guilt phase of Gray's capital murder trial began on December
2, 1985. On the day trial began, Gray's counsel asked the court to order
the Commonwealth to disclose any evidence it planned to introduce at
the sentencing phase to prove future dangerousness if Gray was found
guilty. The prosecuting attorney stated that the Commonwealth would
introduce "evidence of statements [Gray] ha[d] made to other people
about other crimes he ha[d] committed of which he ha[d] not been
convicted." 5 Specifically, the Commonwealth represented that it in-
tended to use statements Gray allegedly made to co-defendant Tucker
that Gray was the triggerman in McClelland's murder and statements
made to the effect that Gray was responsible for the murder of Lisa
Sorrell and her daughter.6 Upon further questioning by defense counsel,
the Commonwealth's attorney also represented that Tucker's testimony,
as well as the testimony of other inmates, would be the only evidence
bearing on the Sorrell murders.
7
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(d).
2 Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313,319,356 S.E.2d 157, 160,
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).
3 Id. at 340, 356 S.E.2d at 172.
4 Id. at 341-342, 356 S.E.2d at 172-173.
5 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074,2078 (1996).
6 Id.
7 Id at 2079 (citations omitted). The following conversation took
place between defense counsel and the pLosecutor in-chambers before
the guilt phase began:
"MR. MOORE: Is it going to be evidence or just his state-
ment?
MR. FERGUSON: Statements that your client made.
MR. MOORE: Nothing other than statements?
MR. FERGUSON: To other people, that's correct. State-
ments made by your client that he did these things." Id. at 2086
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 2078. The Commonwealth also gave notice of additional
testimonial evidence it intended to present to show that the manner used
At the close of all the evidence, the jury convicted Gray on all
counts. The night before the sentencing phase was to begin, the
Commonwealth's attorney contacted defense counsel and informed him
that the prosecution was going to introduce further evidence, beyond
Gray's own admissions, connecting Gray to the Sorrell murders. The
additional evidence to be introduced included: photographs of the crime
scene and bodies of the victims, testimony of the detective who investi-
gated the murders and testimony of the medical examiner who had
performed the autopsies on the Sorrells' bodies. 8
The next morning, Gray's counsel asked the court to exclude any
evidence related to any felony for which Gray had not been indicted
because it exceeded the "scope of unadjudicated-crime evidence admis-
sible for sentencing under Virginia law."9 Gray's counsel also stated that
he was taken by complete surprise and was unprepared to rebut any
evidence other than the alleged statements made by Gray. The court
denied defense counsel's request. The Commonwealth then presented
graphic evidence of the Sorrell murders through the testimony of Detec-
tive Slezak and medical examiner, Dr. Presswalla. The jury subsequently
sentenced Gray to death based on both the future dangerousness and
vileness predicates. 10
Gray's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and
his state habeas corpus petition was dismissed, with the United States
Supreme Court twice denying certiorari.11
Gray then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 
12
The district court vacated Gray's sentence, holding that the "acts of the
prosecution" regarding the additional Sorrells' murder evidence de-
prived the defendant of fair notice and violated due process by undermin-
ing the reliability of the penalty trial proceeding. 13 The Commonwealth
appealed the issuance of the writ to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. 14
The court of appeals, based on the "new rule" doctrine of Teague v.
Lane,15 reversed, ordering Gray's federal habeas corpus petition be
dismissed. 16 Gray then applied for a stay of execution and petitioned for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.17 The Court
to kill Lisa Sorrell and her three-year-old daughter was very similar to
that used to kill McClelland. Id. Lisa Sorrell was shot six times in the
back of the head and left slumped in the front seat of her partially burned
car. Her daughter, Shanta, was found in the trunk of the car, where she
died from carbon monoxide inhalation. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va.
at 345-346, 356 S.E.2d at 175.
9 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2078.
10 Id. at 2078-2079.
11 Id. at 2079 (citations omitted).
12 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
13 Id. at 62 (citations omitted).
14 Id. (citations omitted).
15 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See discussion of Teague v. Lane, infra part
16 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 67.
17 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2080.
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granted certiorari, agreeing to consider, in addition to Gray's notice-of-
evidence claim, his claim that the Commonwealth had breached its
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence under the doctrine of Brady
v. Maryland,18 with respect to the Sorrell murders. 19
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court dismissed theBrady claim on the
ground that it had been procedurally defaulted.20 The Court also deter-
mined that Gray's due process claim of surprise regarding the Sorrell
murders actually contained two distinct claims: a misrepresentation
claim and a notice-of-evidence claim.21 Because the Court found that
Gray's notice-of-evidence claim required a "new rule" under Teague, it
held that the claim did not provide him a basis for which he could seek
federal habeas relief.22 With regard to the misrepresentation claim,
finding that the Commonwealth may have affirmatively misled the
defense and that the procedural posture of this claim was unclear, the
Court remanded the case to determine if the claim was defaulted and, if
not, to decide it.23
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Procedural Default of Brady Claim.
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 24 the Supreme Court held that a petitioner
is procedurally barred from raising a claim in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding if that issue could have been presented on direct appeal or in
a state habeas proceeding, unless he can show cause for the default and
prejudice resulting therefrom. 25 Similarly, under the current federal law
the courts will not entertain a second or subsequent habeas petition
unless the defendant can satisfy two conditions. 26 First, the petitioner
18 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
19 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2080.
20 Id.
21 ld. at 2080-2081. By dividing Gray's due process claim into two
separate issues, the Court was able to disregard some of the support for
a due process violation with little comment. For example, Gray cited In
re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), which concerned a defendant's right to
notice of charges against him. Although Ruffalo contained language
which would have bolstered Gray's due process argument, the Court
merely held that, "[w]hether or not Ruffalo might have supported
petitioner's notice-of-evidence claim .... it does not support the misrep-
resentation claim for which petitioner cites it." Id. at 2082.
22 Id. at 2083-2084.
2 Id.
24 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
25 Id. at 87.
26 McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,489-495 (1991).
27 Id.
28 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2089 n.8. Specifically, the
prosecution did not turn over evidence that tended to show: 1) the police
designated Mr. Sorrell as the sole suspect on evidence sent to the crime
lab; 2) forensic evidence collected tended to link Timothy Sorrell to the
killings; 3) the police knew that Timothy Sorrell had obtained a life
insurance policy on Lisa two weeks before the killing that named him as
the beneficiary, creating an apparent motive for the killings; and, 4) Lisa
Sorrell was unhappy and angry with her husband because she had
recently learned that he was involved in a stolen merchandise ring at his
work. Id. at 2088-2089.
must allege a new ground for relief; and, second, the petitioner must
satisfy the judge that he did not deliberately withhold the claim earlier or
"otherwise abuse the writ."27
Although defense counsel made a request for all exculpatory
evidence pursuant toBrady v. Maryland,2 8 the prosecution did not reveal
evidence tending to show that Timothy Sorrell, not Gray, committed the
murder of Lisa and Shanta Sorrell. 29 Because Gray did not present the
Brady issue on direct appeal or in state habeas, the district court found
that the claim was procedurally barred.30 Because Gray did not make an
attempt to show cause or prejudice for his default, the Supreme Court
agreed with the district court, holding that the Brady claim was de-
faulted.
3 1
II. Notice of Evidence Claim
In Teague, the Court concluded that the application "of constitu-
tional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final
seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the
operation of our criminal justice system," 32 and generally should not be
applied retroactively. 33 However, because the defendant's life and
liberty are at stake in a criminal proceeding, retroactive application of a
"new rule" will apply if: 1) it places "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making author-
ity to proscribe"; or, 2) it violates "watershed rules of criminal proce-
dure."'34 If a court determines that a defendant has requested a "new rule"
and neither exception applies, the application of the Teague doctrine will
bar a decision on the merits of a claim.
Although dicta in the Gray majority opinion suggests it might not
look favorably on what it termed the "notice" claim,35 this suggestion is
even less forceful because of the narrow construction the Court gave to
what it saw as the rule being requested by Gray. In spite of apparently
contrary indications in the record,36 the Court found that no request for
30 Id. at 2080 (citations omitted). The district court dismissed the
Brady claim because the "factual basis for the claim was available to
[Gray] at the time he litigated his state habeas petition," but the issue was
not raised. Id. (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 2080-2081.
32 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309.
33 Id. at 310.
34 Id. at 311-313.
35 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2083-2084. For example, the
Court cites Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). The issue in
Weatherford was whether a defendant's due process rights had been
violated when it was determined that he had been convicted with the aid
of surprise testimony of an accomplice who was an undercover agent. Id.
at 549. The Court rejected defendant's claim, holding that "there is no
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case andBrady did
not create one .... " Id. at 559. It is important to note, however, as was
emphasized by the dissent in Gray: the defendant in Weatherfordwas not
misled by the prosecution; Weatherford did not concern the sentencing
phase of a capital trial, "a stage at which reliability concerns are most
vital"; nor did the defendant in Weatherford object to the surprise
witness, or later demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the informant's
testimony. 116 S. Ct. at 2092 n.12 (citations omitted).
36 Id. at 2083 n.4, 2092 n.l 1 (citations omitted). Not only, as the
district court emphasized, did defense counsel plead with the court "for
additional time to prepare" but counsel openly stated that, due to the
Commonwealth's late notice to introduce additional evidence, he "was
not prepared to try the Sorrell murders" that day. Id. at 2092 n. 11
(citations omitted).
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a continuance had been made, perhaps for tactical reasons. 37 Conse-
quently, the Court characterized Gray's "new rule" being sought as
follows: 1) a right to "receive more than a day's notice of the
Commonwealth's evidence";38 2) a right to a continuance, whether or
not it was requested; or, 3) if a continuance was not granted, exclusion
of the evidence as the only plausible remedy.
39
Determining that Gray's notice-of-evidence claim would amount to
the imposition of a new constitutional rule, the Court then turned its
attention to whether this new rule falls within an exception to the basic
Teague rule.40 The Court focused on the exception "for 'watershed rules
of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accu-
racy ofthe criminal proceeding." 41 The Court explained that an"[e]xample
of a watershed rule of criminal procedure is the requirement that counsel
be provided in all criminal trials for serious offenses," 42 the rule decided
in Gideon v. Wainwright.4 3 The court dismissed Gray's "new rule"
because "it ha[dJ none of the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted
in Gideon or other rules which may be thought to be within the
exception." 44
Dismissing the majority's reasoning that a new rule was required,
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, illustrated that the Court in Gardner v.
Florida45 had held that "the sentencing phase of a capital trial 'must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.' 46 Because of this
fundamental right, "[t]here is nothing 'new' in a rule that a capital
defendant must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend against
the State's penalty phase evidence."47 Consequently, the Teague doc-
trine did not apply in this case.48
The majority unconvincingly distinguished Gardner on the basis
that the defendant in that case had no opportunity to see the confidential
information, whereas Gray-had the opportunity to hear the testimony of
and cross examine Officer Slezak and Dr. Presswalla in open court.49
The fact that Gray was able to hear the testimony of Officer Slezak and
Dr. Presswalla during the sentencing phase of his trial did not afford him
any more of an opportunity to refute the Commonwealth's evidence than
the defendant in Gardner had to contest the confidential report he never
saw. Following the Court's reasoning, there would be a difference
betweenbeing shot in thebackof the headversus being shotwhile staring
into the barrel of a gun the instant before the trigger is pulled. Undoubt-
edly, Gray's due process right, like Gardner's, was violated.
37 Id. at 2083-2084. The Court concluded that Gray's counsel did
not request more time to respond to the evidence, he simply moved "'to
have excluded from evidence during this penalty trial any evidence
pertaining to... any felony for which the defendant has not yet been
charged."' Id. at 2083. (citations omitted). Based on this finding, the
Court determined that "the trial court might well have felt that it would
have been interfering with a tactical decision of counsel to order a
continuance on its own motion." Id. at 2084.
38 Id. at 2083.
39 Id.
4 0 Id. at 2084. The Court dismissed the exception, which allows for
the "retroactive application of a new rule if the rule places a class of
private conduct 'beyond the power of the State to proscribe,"' with little
discussion. Id. (citations omitted).
41 Id. (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 2085 (citations omitted).
43 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2085 (citations omitted).
45 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
46 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2090 (quoting Gardner, 430
U.S. at 358). The question presented in Gardner was whether a
defendant was denied due process when the trial judge sentenced him to
Ill. Misrepresentation Claim
The Supreme Court began its discussion of Gray's misrepresenta-
tion claim by commenting on the three cases cited by Gray in support of
his argument: In reRuffalo,50 Raley v. Ohio,
51 and Mooney v. Holohan.52
However, before the merits of Gray's misrepresentation claim were
addressed, the Court held that it first must be determined whether Gray
presented the misrepresentation claim in the district court or in the court
of appeals.53 According to the Court, if the claim had been presented or
addressed in a lower federal court habeas proceeding, but was not raised
on direct appeal or in state habeas, it might have been procedurally barred
under Sykes. 54 However, the Commonwealth would have been required
to assert procedural default as an affirmative defense or be barred from
asserting it thereafter.
55
Although there was little doubt that the Commonwealth affirma-
tively misled the defense, the Supreme Court concluded that it was
impossible to ascertain whether the misrepresentation claim was raised
in the district court or the court of appeals. Consequently, the Court was
unable to determine whether the Commonwealth had lost its affirmative
defense of procedural default. Because of this ambiguity, the Supreme
Court remanded the misrepresentation claim to the court of appeals to
determine whether it was raised and, if it was, whether the Common-
wealth had preserved any defenses to the claim.
56
IV. Application in Virginia
In spite of the fact that the Court voted five to four to deny relief to
Gray, this decision contains many helpful implications for capital de-
fense counsel at the trial level.
As Justice Stevens illustrates in dissent, the "evidence tending to
support the proposition that petitioner committed the Sorrell murders
was not even sufficient to support the filing of charges against him.
' 57
Although Gray was never charged, much less a suspect, in the Sorrell
murders, the Commonwealth effectively tried him for these unadjudicated
acts during the sentencing phase of Gray's trial.
In a criminal trial, a defendant must be acquitted if ajury finds that
the evidence does not show that he committed the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Although the United States Supreme Court has not
death basing his decision in part on a presentence report which contained
a confidential portion not disclosed to defense counsel. Gardner, 430
U.S. at 350. The Court vacated Gardner's sentence, holding that he "was
denied due process of law when the death [penalty] was imposed, at least
in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny
or explain." Id. at 362.
47 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2090 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 2089-2090 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 2084.
50 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
51 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
52 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
53 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2082.
54 Id. at 2080, 2082 (citations omitted).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 2082-2083.
57 Id. at 2085 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Both this reference and the
Commonwealth's contention that the Sorrell murders were committed
with the same modus operandi make it clear that the sentencing jury has
the task of deciding whether the defendant committed the unadjudicated
act.
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definitively stated what standard of proof is necessary for unadjudicated
acts used to show future dangerousness, a standard is plainly essential for
any disputed issue. Defense counsel should insist that the trial judge give
the jury an instruction indicating that some level of proof, even "prepon-
derance of the evidence," must be reached before unadjudicated acts can
be considered in support of the future dangerousness aggravating factor.
It is imperative that this issue be preserved on the record as a due process
claim.
Because Gray's notice-of-evidence claim was rejected on Teague
grounds, and because of the emphasis on defense counsel's failure to
request a formal continuance, Gray is no authority for the rejection of due
process claims to the right to the identification of the Commonwealth's
evidence as set out in the Motion for Bill of Particulars found in the
VirginiaCapital ClearinghouseTrialManual. Atthe same time, based on
the way Gray's "new rule" was framed, the Court's ruling does foreclose
due process claims to fair notice of inculpatory evidence to be used at the
penalty trial, especially with regard to unadjudicated acts used to show
future dangerousness.
Although section 19.2-264.3:2 of the Virginia Code requires that
the Commonwealth, upon request of the defendant, give notice in writing
of unadjudicated acts it intends to use during a sentencing hearing, the
statute does not indicate when notice must be given. Consequently,
counsel should not only request notice of any unadjudicated acts but
continue to press for the Commonwealth's compliance. The sooner
counsel learns of the unadjudicated acts, the better prepared he will be to
address them. Further, additional motions may be necessary when the
Commonwealth's responses are vague or inaccurate.
5 8
Finally, although the Court found Gray's Brady claim to be de-
faulted, it clearly recognized that exculpatory materials surrounding
allegations of unadjudicated acts are within the ambit of Brady.59 The
later case of Kyles v. Whitley,60 makes it clear that all of the evidence
presented by the prosecution and police relevant to the Sorrell murders
should have been disclosed to Gray's counsel. In Kyles, the Court held
that the prosecution has an affirmative responsibility to turn over all
Brady evidence based on the cumulative effect of such evidence.6 1 The
prosecutormust disclose evidence when there is a reasonable probability
that the result of the proceeding may hinge on the disclosure of that
58 See Case Summary of Barnabei v. Commonwealth, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
59 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2080. Brady itself dealt with
exculpatory evidence relevant to sentencing. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
60 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
61 Id. at 1567.
62 Id. at 1567-1568.
63 Id.
64 In Virginia, no writ of habeas corpus "shall be granted on the
basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the
time of filing any previous petition." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2).
evidence.62 Furthermore, theprosecutorhas the affirmative duty to learn
of any exculpatory evidence known to others acting on the government's
behalf.63 Consequently, defense counsel should press for timely and
particular disclosure, making it clear that if Brady or inculpatory penalty
trial evidence is turned over too late for effective use of such material, a
formal continuance motion will be filed and the responsibility win rest
with the prosecution to demonstrate why this evidence was not given
earlier. Defense counsel must create an adequate record, including, when
appropriate, a representation from the Commonwealth that there is no
exculpatory penalty trial evidence, and that a search has been made for
it.
Because at least four Justices appear to recognize a defendant's
right to contest a state's case for death, and because Gray did not rule on
the merits of this claim, defense counsel should continue to file a Motion
forBill of Particulars similar to thatprovided in the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse Trial Manual. This issue is not foreclosed and should be
preserved.
Because of the harshness of the Virginia default rules,64 it is also
imperative that defense counsel raise every possible issue on as many
grounds as possible on direct appeal or on state habeas. In order to assure
that a claim will not be barred in the future, the claim should be structured
in the same manner in which it was originally raised. 65 Although defense
counsel may not learn of a Brady-type violation until well after the trial
has concluded, claims should be raised as soon as discovered, especially
due to the new time constraints concerning the filing of state and federal
habeas.
66
In an attempt to protect the client, counsel should raise every claim
for which there is even a scintilla of supporting evidence. Likewise,
because the Attorney General will attempt to divide and rename as many
claims as possible for the purpose of asserting that the claim was not
previously raised, defense counsel should try to ensure that the claim
carries only one possible interpretation.
Summary and Analysis by:
C. Cooper Youell, IV
65 Contrary to what the Attorney General will assert, it is not
necessary that the appellate or collateral proceedings claim be precisely
the same raised at trial. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,406-407 n.9
(1988); But cf. Case Summaries of Clagget v. Commonwealth and Goins
v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
66 See Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus
Under theAnti-Terrorism & EffectiveDeath PenaltyAct of1996, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
